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The Case for the Right to Work Act
Paul G. Borron, Jr.*
Louisiana has become the seventeenth state to enact a "Right
to Work" statute, protecting the individual's right to work regard-
less of his membership or non-membership in a labor union.'
It is believed Louisiana's Act 252 of 1954, R.S. 23:881-888, ade-
quately states its own case and that no extensive argument is
required to justify the wisdom of the legislature in enacting this
statute.
Background of the Act
It has long been a matter of public policy that a contract
prohibiting union membership as a condition to obtaining or
maintaining employment is an improper restriction on the free-
dom of employees, and by express statutory enactments such
contracts are forbidden.2 With this as a premise, it cannot be
denied that a contract requiring union membership as a condi-
tion of employment constitutes an element of compulsion irre-
concilable with the basic principles of freedom which form the
foundation of our form of government and society.
In recent years numerous labor disputes and costly strikes
have arisen over the closed and union shop 3 and other forms of
* Member, Borron, Owen, Borron & Delahaye, Eaton Rouge and Plaque-
mine, La.
1. Thirty-three states have legislation affecting closed shop and union
security provisions, but only 17 of these states have what may properly be
termed "Right to Work" laws fully protecting the individual's right to work
regardless of union membership: By constitutional provision and statute-
Arizona (1946), Arkansas (1944), Florida (1944), Nebraska (1946), and South
Dakota (1946). By statute-Alabama (1953), Georgia (1947), Iowa (1947),
Louisiana (1954), Mississippi (1954), Nevada (1952), North Dakota (1948),
North Carolina (1947), South Carolina (1954), Tennessee (1947), Texas (1947),
and Virginia (1947).
2. La. Acts 1914, No. 294, p. 602, LA. R.S. 23:824 (1950). Federal statutes-
National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 61 STAT. 136 et seq. (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1952); Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 et seq. (1932), 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (1952); Railway
Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (1952).
3. "Closed Shop"-a form of so-called "union security" In which the
employer obligates himself to hire and retain in his employ only union
members.
"Union Shop"-a form of so-called union security in which union mem-
bership is a condition of continued employment although not of original
employment. Under a union shop clause all employees must become members
of the contracting union at a specified time, usually 30 days, after their
original employment or after the execution of the agreement.
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compulsory union membership, many of which have assumed
nation-wide proportions. Through so-called "union security"
clauses,4 unions have been able to exercise great and monopo-
listic power over the individual worker's right to obtain and
maintain employment. Evils and abuses have necessarily fol-
lowed. As a result our legislative bodies have felt impelled to
devise means of curbing this monopoly.
In 1947 Congress became partially awakened to the evils of
compulsory unionism, and in the enactment of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) prohibited the closed
shop. However, this prohibition relates only to industries affect-
ing interstate commerce and specifically exempts agricultural
workers.
The Taft-Hartley Act does not bar the union shop, but by
Section 14 (b) it expressly sanctions state "Right to Work" laws
which prohibit the union shop as well as other forms of com-
pulsory unionism.5 Congress therefore has recognized the need,
on the state level, for laws banning all forms of compulsory
union membership, while regulating practically all other phases
of labor-management relations in industries affecting interstate
commerce.
Substance of the Act
The significant provision found in all "Right to Work" stat-
utes is that no person shall be denied employment because of
non-membership in a labor union. There are some dissimi-
larities in other provisions of these statutes in the completeness
of the description of coverage, definitions, enforcement and pen-
alties for violations. However, basically, they are similar.
The Louisiana act is taken in large part from the Virginia
"Right to Work" statute.6 The only significant difference is that
the Virginia statute provides that a violation constitutes a crime,
whereas the Louisiana statute contains no penal provision. The
language of the Louisiana statute is simple and its full import
is well stated in the declaration of public policy contained in
4. "Union-Security Clause"-provision in union contract that fixes the
position of the union in the plant and its relation to the workers in their
jobs. Examples are "closed shop," "union shop" and "maintenance-of-
membership" clauses.
5. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)
(1952): "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execu-
tion or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
6. VA. CODs 40:68 et seq. (1950).
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Section 1, which provides that: "It is hereby declared to be the
public policy of Louisiana that the right of a person or persons
to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of member-
ship or non-membership in any labor union or labor organiza-
tion."
The remaining provisions effectuate this public policy, pro-
vide the specific acts which constitute a violation, and provide
remedies to insure enforcement. Section 2 prohibits any agree-
ment or practice which denies to any person the right to obtain
or maintain employment because of non-membership in a labor
union. Section 3 prohibits any agreement or practice designed
to cause or which does cause any employer, whether or not a
party to the agreement, to violate the act. Thus, this provision
makes unlawful agreements with or economic pressure on one
employer designed to compel another employer, such as a sub-
contractor or supplier, to violate the act. Section 4 makes unlaw-
ful lockouts, strikes, picketing, or other similar conduct a pur-
pose or effect of which is to cause a violation of the act. Section
5 provides that no person shall be required by an employer to
become or remain a member of any labor union as a condition
of employment. This section, in large part, is a restatement of
Section 2, and constitutes an express prohibition of the closed
and union shop contract. Section 6 prohibits any employer from
requiring a person to abstain or refrain from union membership
as a condition of employment. Thus, Sections 5 and 6 specifically
prohibit compulsion either as to union membership or non-union
membership. Section 7 prohibits any employer from requiring
any person to pay dues, fees or other charges to a labor union
as a condition of employment. Section 8 grants to any person
who is denied employment or continuation of employment in
violation of the act the right to recover damages from the vio-
lator of the act. Section 9 authorizes injunctive relief from
violations or threatened violations of the act. Section 10 provides
that nothing in the act shall be construed to deny or abridge
the right of employees to bargain collectively.
Under Section 11 the act is not applicable to contracts exist-
ing on its effective date (July 28, 1954). It does apply to all
contracts entered after the effective date or to any renewal or
extension of any existing contract.
Scope of the Act
The statute applies to "the right of a person or persons to
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work" in Louisiana, without exception, and, therefore, affects
all employers, employees and labor unions in the state, whether
their activities relate to interstate commerce or solely to intra-
state commerce. Its scope could be narrowed only if its pro-
visions were found to be in conflict with federal law. However,
there is no conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, which is the federal law gen-
erally regulating labor relations in all businesses affecting inter-
state commerce. As previously indicated, the Taft-Hartley Act
expressly recognizes the right of states to enact "Right to Work"
laws. A possible conflict lies in the limited area of labor relations
of those interstate carriers affected by the Railway Labor Act.7
The effect of such a conflict has been adjudicated by the courts
of several other jurisdictions with no unanimity of judicial
thinking.8 One state district court has recently held the union
shop provision of the Railway Labor Act unconstitutional. 9
Constitutionality of the Act
The unconstitutionality of "Right to Work" laws has been
vigorously and repeatedly urged by labor unions. It has been
charged that such laws deny freedom of speech, the sanctity of
contracts and other constitutionally guaranteed rights. The com-
plete fallacy of these contentions has been conclusively estab-
lished by the Supreme Court of the United States, which has
upheld such statutes in several decisions rendered in recent
years.'0
In Lincoln Federal Labor Union, AFL v. Northwestern Iron
& Metal Co.," the Supreme Court, in sustaining the constitu-
tionality of the Nebraska and North Carolina "Right to Work"
statutes, discussed every conceivable point on which the statutes
could be challenged. The Court particularly held that these
statutes (1) do not abridge freedom of speech, (2) do not ille-
gally impair obligations of contracts, (3) do not deny equal pro-
tection of the law to unions as against employers and non-union
7. 44 STAT. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1952),
8. Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R., 24 CCH LABOR CASES IT 68,095 (Neb. St.
Dist. 1954); Allen v. Southern Ry., 114 F. Supp. 72 (W.D.N.C. 1953); Matter
of Florida East Coast Ry., debtor, 24 CCH Labor Cases ff 67,806 (U.S.D.C.S.D.
Fla. 1953).
9. Sandsberry v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry., 25 CCH LABOR CASES
ff 68,128 (D.C. Potter County, Texas 1954).
10. Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953); Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. and Whitaker v. North Caro-
lina, 335 U.S. 525 (1949); American Federation of Labor v. American Sash &
Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
11. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
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workers, (4) do not deny liberty without due process of law.
The Court further held that "[t]here cannot be wrung from a
constitutional right of workers to assemble to discuss improve-
ment of their own working standards, a further constitutional
right to drive from remunerative employment all other persons
who will not or cannot, participate in union assemblies."
In the Lincoln Federal Labor Union case Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, in a strong concurring opinion, while not assuming the
advocacy of "Right to Work" laws, advanced numerous argu-
ments to indicate their inherent wisdom. He pointed out "the
experience of countries advanced in industrial democracy, such
as Great Britain and Sweden, where deeply rooted acceptance of
the principles of collective bargaining is not reflected in uncom-
promising demands for contractually guaranteed security.' 12
The opinion, by footnote, quoted the provision of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations that "No one
shall be compelled to belong to an association." Mr. Justice
Frankfurter also quoted extensively from the late Mr. Justice
Brandeis, who before becoming a Supreme Court Justice, had
been a staunch promoter of unionism. Mr. Justice Brandeis in
a discussion entitled "Peace with Liberty and Justice," in sum-
ming up his views on unionism, had stated:
"It [the union] need not include every member of the trade.
Indeed, it is desirable for both the employer and the union
that it should not. Absolute power leads to excesses and to
weakness: Neither our character nor our intelligence can
long bear the strain of unrestricted power. The union attains
success when it reaches the ideal condition, and the ideal
condition for a union is to be strong and stable, and yet to
have in the trade outside its own ranks an appreciable num-
ber of men who are non-unionist. In any free community the
diversity of character, of beliefs, of taste-indeed mere self-
ishness-will insure such a supply, if the enjoyment of this
privilege of individualism is protected by law."'13
General Observations
Every conceivable argument has been advanced by the op-
ponents of "Right to Work" legislation against the wisdom of
its enactment and the disastrous consequences which might result
therefrom. It has been charged that such laws will destroy col-
12. Id. at 548.
13. Id. at 551-52.
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lective bargaining, will interfere with an employee's right to join
a labor union or participate in union activities, will permit
employer discrimination against unions, will destroy the power
of unions, and will provoke low wage rates and standards of liv-
ing. Each of these contentions when analyzed is found to be
based on an erroneous concept of the meaning and significance
of the law. These arguments will continue to be advanced by
those who feel that organized labor should not be regulated in
its monopolistic practices, as industry has been. A mere reading
of the act discloses it does nothing more than prohibit the
evils of compulsory unionism and union monopoly, and does
not impair or affect the many legitimate practices of organized
labor to achieve its objectives.
The act does not affect the right of employees to join a union
or retain their union membership. As indicated above, it ex-
pressly provides to the contrary. The act does not interfere with
the right of employees to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing. Section 10 of the act expressly
guarantees this right.
The act does not permit an employer to discriminate against
an employee who is a member of a union. It expressly provides
that no person shall be required to give up union membership
as a condition of employment.
The power of unions will not be affected. Any particular
union which through proper and intelligent leadership and
effective collective bargaining has won the support of the em-
ployees it represents will not be affected by the act. The act
does prohibit any labor union from securing the aid of an em-
ployer to force the employees to join the union as a condition
of their employment.
The act does not and cannot destroy the legitimate gains
attained by labor unions for their members, nor does it preclude
future gains. Labor unions are free to continue all legitimate
practices and procedures, through collective bargaining and the
exercise of economic strength, to improve the living standards
and working conditions of their members.
A comparison of wage increases in areas which have "Right
to Work" laws with those in areas which do not have such laws
clearly shows the fact that there is no relationship between wage
increases and "Right to Work" laws. As an illustration, United
States Department of Labor Bulletin No. 1152, entitled "Union
1954]
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Wages and Hours: Building Trades-July 1, 1953," compiled
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, indicates wage increases in the major building
trade groups in fifty-two larger cities of the nation between
July 1952 and July 1953. Twelve of these fifty-two cities are in
states which had "Right to Work" laws.14 The average percent
of increase in the twelve "Right to Work" cities was 5.58, well
above the national average of 5.2 in all of the fifty-two cities.
Other figures compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of
the United States Department of Labor, showing the average
weekly and hourly earnings of production workers in manu-
facturing industries for selected states and areas during the
period 1947 to 1952, also indicate the complete lack of relation-
ship between wage rates and "Right to Work" laws.15 It is
interesting to compare the 1950 and 1953 average hourly earn-
ings of these production workers in Louisiana with those of the
neighboring state of Texas. The average hourly earnings in
Louisiana in 1950 were $1.25 and in 1953 had increased to $1.41.
Louisiana had no "Right to Work" act during this period. The
average hourly earnings in Texas in 1950, where a "Right to
Work" law was enacted in 1947, were $1.35 and in 1953 had
increased to $1.57.
It is contended by opponents of "Right to Work" legislation
that the closed shop and the union shop constitute nothing more
than majority rule and that this majority rule in labor relations
is similar to that in our democratic processes. Under the closed
shop and union shop concept of majority rule, all minorities are
eliminated, and membership in the majority organization is made
compulsory. It thus becomes obvious that the so-called majority
rule, as practiced in compulsory unionism, is in fact a one-party
rule. This is in direct conflict with the accepted democratic prin-
ciples of this country.
As indicated at the outset, it is believed the statute ade-
quately presents its own case. The great majority of the people
14. BULLETIN No. 1152, UNION WAGES AND HOURS: BUILDING TRADES--July
1, 1953, Table 6 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1953):
Atlanta, Ga.-6.2%; Charlotte, N.C.-5.4%; Dallas, Texas-6.3%; Des Moines,
Iowa-4.3% ; Houston, Texas-3.7%; Jacksonville, Fla.-6.8% ; Knoxville,
Tenn.-4.2%; Little Rock, Ark.-8:4% ; Memphis, Tenn.-6.4%; Omaha, Neb.-
6.3%; Richmond, Va.-4.2%; San Antonio, Texas--4.8%.
15. HOURS AND EARNINGS, INDUSTRY REPORT, Annual Supplement Issue,
April 1953, Table 7 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1953).
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of this nation have repeatedly and effectively expressed their
abhorrence of compulsion and monopoly. The enactment by the
Louisiana legislature of a "Right to Work" law, eliminating com-
pulsion in the exercise of the individual's right to obtain gainful
employment and prohibiting monopoly in labor, is but a further
manifestation of this thinking and policy.
